Showing posts with label Coalition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Coalition. Show all posts

Tuesday, 13 June 2017

On Hung Parliaments and Confidence

The Fixed Term Parliaments Act has no shortage of detractors and is often misunderstood. One of the (misplaced) criticisms that has been made of the FTPA is the effect it would have on constitutional convention and practice concerning the vote on a Queen's Speech or a Budget. I wrote this post to try to explain both how the convention concerning the appointment and resignation of governments operates and how, if at all, this has been affected by the FTPA.

The Historical Position

Historically, a Commons defeat on a major bill that was core to the governing platform of the incumbent government would be indicative that the government had "lost the confidence" of the House of Commons. In a Parliamentary democracy (unlike a presidential democracy) a government that does not command the confidence of the elected legislature has lost its legitimacy: its right to govern. As in any other walk of life, if a set of office-holders have "lost the confidence" of those that put them there, we clearly don't just mean that they are wrong; we mean that they are no longer fit to assume their position and to be custodians of their office. A Prime Minister is expected to resign: it is their constitutional duty to do so even if legally they are not required to.

But did they actually have to resign?

The only alternative to resignation that was historically open to a Prime Minister was to ask the Queen to dissolve Parliament and to bring about a new set of elections. It might reasonably be thought, however, that this option was only open to a no-confidenced Prime Minister, where there was no clear alternative individual capable of forming a government that would command the confidence of the House of Commons. In those circumstances it would have been open to the monarch to refuse that request, though it would have been extremely unusual for a monarch to refuse such a request and become embroiled in the political merits of a premature dissolution.

In practice, in any instance where a government was composed of a single party having close to an overall majority, including ones that had not long lost them, there would not be an obvious alternative individual from another party capable of commanding the confidence of the Commons. This would make a request to dissolve Parliament and conduct fresh elections a viable course of action. Although the monarch could dismiss their Prime Minister in that interim period if they so wished, in practice they would not do so. It is constitutionally viable, though not without its problems, for the office of Prime Minister to be vacant for a short period of time and for the Cabinet to govern in the interim at the pleasure of the Crown.

Can the Prime Minister try to stay-on without majority Commons support?

Where this gets interesting is in a hung-parliament where there is a large or power-broking third-party. This might mean they have a genuine "choice" as to who they wish to provide Parliamentary support to to enable either of the other two other parties to form a government commanding the confidence of the Commons. This dilemma emerged after the 1974 February and 2010 General Elections, where the incumbent Prime Minister's party fell short of a majority and came second by seats, but where the Official Opposition failed to win an overall majority. Both Ted Heath and Gordon Brown could, constitutionally, have attempted to introduce a Queen's Speech and to try to gain support from smaller parties to see it pass, rather than resign and recommend that the Leader of the Opposition should form a government.

If they lost that Queen's Speech, however, they would be expected to resign just as Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin did following the tabling of a motion of no confidence against him on the opening of the 1923 Parliamentary session. He had won the plurality but not the majority of seats in that election, and the other two parties tabled that motion. The resignations of Ted Heath and Gordon Brown were pre-empting a loss of confidence; they were taking the election result, rather than a vote of confidence, as a direct if indicative cue for what they anticipated Parliament would do.

This explains why Theresa May was entitled to continue to stay on as Prime Minister despite falling short of a majority and despite not yet having immediately secured a confidence commitment from the DUP. Under the current Parliamentary arithmetic, the Conservative Party not only is the most viable party to lead a government; it is probably the only party that conceivably could do so. After all, it only requires the DUP to abstain on a vote of confidence to win it if all their own MPs back it; a Labour-led administration would require the explicit support of the DUP (and several other disparate parties) to win a confidence vote. Only if it subsequently becomes clear that Theresa May could not count on the DUP not to oppose her in a confidence vote would an expectation of resignation emerge.

If a coalition or supply-and-confidence deal were to break down during a Parliament, the expectation would be either that an agreement in principle has been reached to form a new Commons majority with another other party (to form a new government) or that no party was able to command the confidence of the House. If the former is the case, the Prime Minister is expected to resign. It would be expected that the Queen invites the Leader of the Opposition (or whoever the coalition parties have agreed is best placed to lead a government) to form a government. If the latter is the case, the Prime Minister might be allowed instead to seek a General Election.

For whom ought a Prime Minister to have resigned?

Technically of course, the Queen can invite anyone to form a government and can ask for the resignation of a Prime Minister. By convention, and extremely sensible practice, she does not do so.

It is possible that someone else from within their own party would be the person best placed, rather than the Leader of the Opposition, in which case it would be open to the Prime Minister to offer their resignation to the monarch and recommend that she invite them to form a government instead. The monarch in modern times would normally seek to avoid involving themselves in any decision of this nature, but a Prime Minister would be putting them in that position if their recommendation to appoint internally was not the most-supported option by the House of Commons.

There is no immediate such example that springs to mind of this happening in British political history. What there is precedent for is a Prime Minister resigning as the leader of their political party before resigning as Prime Minister, once their successor has been appointed according to the relevant party rules. This was what happened with David Cameron's handover to Theresa May, Tony Blair's handover to Gordon Brown and Margaret Thatcher's handover to John Major. In those instances the successor to the Prime Minister was obvious: the leader of the party with a majority of seats in the Commons. It would have been inconceivable in 2007 for the Queen to invite David Cameron to form a government, or for her to ask Neil Kinnock to form one in 1990 or Jeremy Corbyn in 2016.

Unfortunately, without modern precedent for situations where a majority did not exist, the involvement of the monarch is inevitable should a Prime Minister recommend that a member of their own party should be invited to form the government but a sizeable part of the Commons objects that someone else (probably but not necessarily the Leader of the Opposition) should instead be invited. There would need to be constitutional rules put in place to preserve that institutional distance as things stand.

What counts as a motion of no confidence?

A Queen's Speech is clearly a defining question of confidence. It represents the government's proposed legislative programme for the Parliamentary session. Rejecting that is tantamount to rejecting its right to govern.

The annual Budget may be slightly different. Although Finance Bills are critical to the functioning of a government, the failure of a specific budget might not mean that the legislature does not have the confidence in the government to pass a budget. This is an observation that SpinningHugo has made before, though I would add a specific example in support of this premise. While governing as a minority government in Scotland, the SNP initially failed to pass its budget in January 2009. After making concessions to other political parties, it passed at the second attempt. That budget was not taken as an indication that the Scottish Government had lost the confidence of the Scottish Parliament, though repeated failures to get a budget through might.

Another way that the House of Commons can indicate that it has no confidence in the government is simply to table a motion to that effect and to win that vote. This was how James Callaghan was defeated in 1979. Believing that no other individual could any more clearly command the confidence of the House of Commons as elected, he asked the Queen to dissolve Parliament, allowing a fresh set of elections to take place.

What does the Fixed Term Parliaments Act change?

The Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 removes the prerogative power of premature dissolution of Parliament. The Prime Minister can no longer ask the Queen to dissolve Parliament.

Instead, if an early General Election is to be held, there must either be a vote in favour of one in the Commons supported by not fewer than 434 MPs (as happened to trigger the 2017 General Election) or if a very specific procedure happens.

If the House of Commons passes a motion by a simple majority saying:
"That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government."
And then 14 days pass without it passing a motion saying:
 "That this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government."
Parliament is dissolved and a General Election takes place.

This has, effectively, replaced an executive power to trigger an election with a legislative one. The Prime Minister no longer gets to decide whether or not a General Election should be held. This Act, therefore, by implication withdraws the alternative course of action available to a Prime Minister if their government loses a vote of no-confidence. Constitutionally, their only option is to resign. The next best placed person ought then to be invited to form a government. This will often be, but does not have to be the Leader of the Opposition.

What does it not change?

This transfer of power does not change the constitutional conventions that apply concerning whether or not a government should resign. The dissolution of Parliament, in itself, has no bearing on whether or not the Prime Minister is the best placed person to command the confidence of the Commons, even if, during an election itself, there is no sitting House of Commons to express confidence or no confidence.

This transfer of power does not change what constitutes a "vote of no confidence" for the purposes of determining whether or not a Prime Minister is under a constitutional duty to resign. This is a common mistake that both Members of Parliament and journalists have frequently parroted in the last few days. It says instead that, following a specific type of no confidence motion, either a government commanding the confidence of the House must be formed within a fortnight or an election must happen. The Act is completely and utterly silent as to what, constitutionally, ought to happen in that 14 day window.

So what should/could happen?

If the Queen's Speech is voted down, one of three things could happen:

1. The Prime Minister resigns and the Queen invites the Leader of the Opposition to form a government.

If this happens, it is open to the Tories as the largest party immediately to table a motion of no-confidence under the terms of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act in any government the Leader of the Opposition attempts to form. The (then) Prime Minister would then have to (a) successfully form a government within 14 days and get a positive confidence motion passed; (b) resign; or (c) remain in his position while a General Election takes place.

2. The Prime Minister resigns and the Queen either delays in appointing a new Prime Minister or immediately invites another individual from the current government (probably a senior member of the Cabinet) to attempt to form a government.

If this happens, it is open to the combined party effort that voted-down the Queen's Speech to bring a motion under the terms of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act and do exactly as the Tories would do in scenario 1.

3. The Prime Minister breaches constitutional convention and refuses to resign.

If this happens, Parliament has a remedy available to it that is constitutionally proper: it can table a FTPA motion of no-confidence and trigger an election.

What's the problem?

What is arguably unhelpful about the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is that the use of "confidence" in the simple majority election trigger may itself be understood as creating an obligation on the government to resign. In scenario 1, for example, this would mean the Leader of the Opposition, within literally hours of being invited to form a government and accepting, could be put under a constitutional duty to resign.

Common sense, however, says that this is clearly not what a motion under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act intends if it immediately follows the resignation of another confidence-defeated government. This is even more clearly not the case when you consider what would have happened before the FTPA was passed. If a Queen's Speech had fallen, and a Prime Minister requested the dissolution of Parliament, the monarch could, constitutionally, have refused that dissolution. In those circumstances, the Prime Minister would have still been expected to resign.

If, however, on attempting to form a government, the invited Leader of the Opposition concluded that they could not command the confidence of the Commons either, they too would then have asked the monarch to dissolve Parliament and bring about another General Election and it would be much more difficult, constitutionally, for the monarch to deny that request. That is what this 14-day period is, constitutionally, intended to do: give a new Prime Minister a chance to broker a deal to form a government.

The nomenclature could, therefore, be cleaned-up a little, but the Act does in fact separate perfectly constitutionally consistently, the questions of formation of a government from the calling of an election.

The real problem?

The only plausible problem with this arrangement is that the political incentives, for a long time, connected the powers and duties of the prime minister as they related to the formation of a government and the dissolution of parliament, and made them almost exactly concurrently exercised. The Fixed Term Parliaments Act breaks the two apart more explicitly. It arguably shifts the political incentives, moreover, on the part of a Prime Minister to take-up option three articulated above. It may now be much easier for a Prime Minister to defy constitutional convention that they should resign on losing a Queen's Speech, on the grounds that "well if they table a FTPA motion of no-confidence I'm only staying on for 14 days anyway before the people can decide". This argument might be especially potent if they represent the largest party and there is no realistic prospect of the Official Opposition forming an alternative government on the present Parliamentary arithmetic.

In these circumstances, it is particularly important that political actors should bring pressure to bear that the existing and not excised constitutional conventions concerning the resignation of a Prime Minister are properly respected. And if they are not respected, as with any other constitutional convention, Parliament should make full use of its remedial powers by forcing the Prime Minister to hold a General Election, and then the electoral process should allow voters to cast a judgment whether the Prime Minister's abuse of power is egregious and indefensible.

If your argument is that these protections are poorly enforced, then I agree. But that's an argument against relying upon constitutional conventions; not against the Fixed Term Parliaments Act. At best it is an argument that the office of Prime Minister should be appointed following an express nomination of a candidate by the House of Commons on a term that expires following the holding of a General Election. It would better guarantee that any appointment to the office of Prime Minister did in fact command the confidence of the Commons. This approach could, for instance, be modeled upon the approach to election of First Minister in the devolved assemblies.

Under sections 45 and 46 of the Scotland Act 1998 for example, the Presiding Officer shall recommend to the monarch a nominated individual to become First Minister, as chosen by the Holyrood Parliament. Such a nomination takes place whenever there is a vacancy, or following an election. If no nomination is made within 28 days, the Parliament is dissolved and another election is held. In the event of a vacancy, the Presiding Officer can delegate the functions of First Minister to another individual for the duration of that vacancy. This approach might clean-up the ambiguity of what is meant by a "confidence" motion in the FTPA.

The truth is that the old system that preceded the Fixed Term Parliaments Act would have handled this type of situation no better than the current one. It allowed Prime Ministers to escape resignation by appealing immediately and directly to the country, even when an alternative viable government could be formed from the democratically elected Parliament. These decisions are no longer a privilege the Prime Minister enjoys, exploiting in the process the political sensitivity of the Crown. It is instead for Parliament itself to decide.

For a Parliament man like me, that is, when all is said and done, a no bad thing.

Saturday, 24 September 2011

Ed Miliband's Tax Cut for Rich Graduates

So Ed Miliband has decided that Labour's policy on tuition fees is to reduce the cap in England from £9000 per year to £6000 per year. He says that this will be funded by more taxes on the banks and increasing the rate of interest paid by the highest earning graduates.

The reason? This is what he says, in an ever so pious dig at the coalition:

"We can't build a successful economy if the kids from all backgrounds are put off going to university."

Now we can debate the rights and wrongs about the Coalition policy until the cows come home. But let us look at what practical difference this actually makes. I have used the projections that MoneySavingExpert.co.uk deduced. I refer you to the red table at bullet point 17 "How much do you pay".

As we have established many times before, the loans repayment programme (thus in practice for a student, their tuition fees) has a 30 year limit, after which any existing "debt" is written off and the system effectively operated as a graduate tax on their earnings over the earnings threshold (currently £21k).

If a student earns less than £35k as their initial graduate salary, and their earnings rise to slightly less than £140k after 30 years, they will not have paid off their student loan, regardless of whether or not they actually chose a course that charged £6k a year or £9k a year. There is no appreciable link between what that graduate "owed" and what they "paid" for their University education.

Contrastingly if a student earns around £50k initial graduate salary and that rises with career progression and inflation etc. so after 30 years they are earning over £200k, they will pay back the whole of their student loan, and will do so well before that 30 year period elapses. In this instance, it therefore matters a lot more how much they "owed" and it correlates much more closely to what they "pay". The difference for that student taking a £9k course rather than a £6k course is that they pay about 50% more, because, funnily enough, they owed roughly 50% more.

So can you see where I'm heading with this? Yep. That's right. Lowering the limit on tuition fees to £6k has ABSOLUTELY no effect on the lowest-earning graduates, but represents a potentially HUGE saving for the most affluent of graduates! Since we have established that the funding system is effectively a kind of graduate tax, this means that Labour are advocating a TAX CUT on the richest beneficiaries of an English University education! The difference between what is owed is substantial enough that the interest rates they'd need to charge the richest graduates to make them pay the same, let alone more, would be of Wonga.com proportions compared to those they pay now.

And of course, this poses the question of where the Universities are going to plug the hole in the finances this creates? Are we to expect more direct state funding? Where is that coming from without increasing the deficit? "Tax the banks" Labour reply. Well here's the thing. Your bonus tax raised absolute pittance compared with the Coalition's banking levy. Just like with the very tuition fees you promised you would never introduce, you command no credibility for delivery.

But that is not even the worst thing about this sordid affair. The worst thing is that Labour, by engaging in this piece of political misrepresentation, are perpetuating the very myths that they have used to scare young people into thinking they can no longer afford to go to University under the Coalition changes. They are doing the very thing that the Lib Dems got crucified for: politicking with the tuition "fee" when they know full well that that headline figure is of zero relevance to the majority of graduates, for whom the repayment matters. They have scaremongered those from poorer backgrounds into believing they can no longer aspire to a University education and all the benefits that brings. Yet their own policy does absolutely nothing to help these people. There is nothing about maintenance grants, which are what really affect the ability of the poorest to be able to go to Uni. This throws money at graduates who are already benefiting in a huge financial way from their degree.

Remember, this is the Labour Party. The Party of Keir Hardie, of Nye Bevan and of Clement Attlee. Those men would be turning in their graves if they saw what this manipulative and regressive cabal led by Ed Miliband and Ed Balls has become.

The Labour Party. Party of the Poor? Words truly fail me.

Tuesday, 20 September 2011

22 Days in May - A Major Lib Dem Concession

A few days ago I took ownership of David Laws' account of the negotiations following from the 2010 General Election result. It's a fascinating read (I'm about 1/3 of the way through) and I'd recommend people add it to their lists. My favourite exchange between the negotiating parties is one I hadn't seen in most other reviews of the account. I hope the publishers don't mind if I reproduce the following section (p117-118):
"We paused briefly to consider the issue of what we should say about Britain joining the euro. 'It will not surprise you to know that we are opposed to this," said George Osborne. Chris Huhne, a former MEP and euro enthusiast smiled, and said, 'Well. We have met none of the criteria for convergence, so this is not really an issue.' I shouted out 'Hurrah!', as I have never been a big fan of Britain joining the euro, and have never thought that there was the slightest chance of the British people supporting the euro in a referendum. Andrew Stunell lent forward and said to the Conservative team: 'I hope you realise that this is a very big Lib Dem concession!' We all laughed."
Some other interesting parts include some of the lessons learned from Coalition negotiating strategy in Scotland, with David Laws having been involved in the 1999 talks. It was a curious contrast of Labour's strategy in those talks, where they faced deadlock for about 4 days on a number of key policy differences before relenting, as opposed to desperately scrambling towards Lib Dem positions without the credibility of numbers in the lobby to back them in 2010. What was more intriguing was the way the impasse over the AV referendum was dealt with; being referred up to Cameron and Clegg to discuss so as not to compromise progress on other policy negotiations.

Tuesday, 26 July 2011

DNA - Do Not About-turn

Just over a month ago at PMQs, Ed Miliband tried to bounce David Cameron into a u-turn over plans to end the routine retention of DNA samples given by those who are arrested but not charged with rape and other related offences.

At the time it was heartening to see Cameron refuse to back down on that front. From the outset, I should make clear that I don't think the Government's policy as it stood a month ago goes far enough to protect basic freedoms: those charged but never convicted will still have DNA routinely kept on file and those arrested but not charged can, on application have samples retained. My own position is pretty much exactly as stated in the Lib Dem Manifesto:
"Remove innocent people from the police DNA database and stop storing DNA from innocent people and children in the future, too." Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 p94

I recognise that the Coalition's position on this was more nuanced, stating:
"We will adopt the protections of the Scottish model for the DNA database." Coalition Agreement 2010 p11

And for the sake of completeness, the Conservative Manifesto said of DNA retention:
"The indefinite retention of innocent people’s DNA is unacceptable, yet DNA data provides a  useful tool for solving crimes. We will legislate to make sure that our DNA database is used  primarily to store information about those who are guilty of committing crimes rather than those  who are innocent. We will collect the DNA of all existing prisoners, those under state supervision who have been convicted of an offence, and anyone convicted of a serious recordable offence. We pushed the Government to end the permanent retention of innocent people’s DNA , and we  will change the guidance to give people on the database who have been wrongly accused of a  minor crime an automatic right to have their DNA withdrawn." Conservative Party Manifesto 2010 p80

For those who are unfamiliar with the Scottish system, anyone who is found innocent of any crime in relation to which they have given a DNA sample has it removed from the database (unless specifically challenged) after 3 years. The position in the rest of the UK is different; the limit is 6 years and was introduced under the Labour Government. Last year the Scottish Labour party's Holyrood delegation attempted to amend the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill to bring Scotland into line with the rest of the UK, but the SNP, Lib Dems and Tories(!) told them where to go.

My concerns today arise with news that whilst DNA samples of innocent persons will no longer be stored on the centralised national database, they will be retained by some local forensic labs. Whilst I can appreciate that there may be practical difficulties in ensuring the total destruction of innocent persons' DNA data, I have huge misgivings about this. It is inconceivable that particular samples cannot be linked to individuals even if they're being held locally rather than nationally, and that's simply unacceptable if those people have never been convicted of any serious offence.

If the government proceeds on that basis, it's a cop-out. My message to Clegg, Cameron, May and Clarke is this: ignore Ed Miliband; stand-up for freedoms and Do Not About-turn on your Coalition agreement with this miserable little compromise.

Don't let the state turn you
into a binary series

Saturday, 21 August 2010

Tough week for the Liberal Democrats

Been a rough week for the Lib Dems: since the election, they've seen their poll ratings down about 10% or so, on 14% according to the latest YouGov poll. A lot of tiresome "ConDem" bashing is really starting to get on my wick.

A few stories in particular caught my attention, though. The first is in relation to Simon Hughes, who to be fair was never exactly going to be a LibCon enthusiast. He caused a bit of a stir by talking about a coalition veto, and reiterating that a future LibLab pact was still "on the agenda". When I first saw this, my immediate reaction was quite similar to Boris Johnson's aide and London Assembly member James Cleverly: it came across as Hughes trying to derail the spirit of the coalition in what is undoubtedly a challenging context. I was particularly angered because the inference I drew from his, and the mutterings of some other LibDem supporters I know was that they would only ever be comfortable with a coalition with Labour. It seems to me, frankly, to be quite hypocritical for those who believe in proportional electoral systems and therefore coalition based government, not to work with the coalition the election result dealt them. How democratic would it be if, under STV, we had de facto permanent LibLab government because their core votes plus just a handful of swing voters happens to make-up 50% or thereabouts of the voting electorate?

Tony Benn once said of those in power that one of the most important questions we need the answer to is "how can we get rid of you?". A Liberal Democrat party backing Labour all the time would make it absolute hell to get rid of an almost certainly Labour dominated government. Given Labour's track record of overspending and expanding the state beyond acceptable levels, that would be a truly dire, illiberal and certainly undemocratic reality.

HOWEVER, having thought about it for a couple of days, I actually think what Simon Hughes has done is a potential blessing in disguise: for the Lib Dems AND for the Coalition. With Labour doing everything they can to leech off  Lib Dem support (more of later!) the main accusation has been that the Lib Dems have been annexed by the Tories and have sold-out their principles to facilitate cuts. The effect of Hughes' superficial scepticism of the coalition could be to act as the lightening rod for Lib Dem disaffection, preventing large-scale defection to Labour and providing Nick Clegg with a useful check on the Tories if they try to deviate too far from the coalition agreement. Because of their core votes, the Tories are never going to be fully social liberals, and the Lib Dems never fully economically liberals. In the absence of a strong "libertarian" grouping in the UK, the existence of a strong Liberal Democrat party is absolutely essential to produce even occasional semblance of such an agenda. By channelling economic disaffection to a figure within the Lib Dems, the Coalition is more likely to hold, and in time, prosper.

The second "news" story relates to rumours that Charles Kennedy and 5 other Liberal Democrat MPs are planning to defect to Labour by the end of the month. The claim has been denied officially by Lib Dem Officials and although not yet by the man himself, I'm largely sceptical that there's any truth in it. Jo Swinson, one of those I would have thought would be among any number led by Kennedy, has point blank denied knowledge of any defections in the pipeline (Kennedy or others) and made clear in no uncertain terms that she has no desire to defect to Labour! As a final link, after a lot of speculation on Twitter, I thought this Tweet rather hit the nail on the head.

If, however, the rumour does prove to be true, I think it would not only be a sad day for the UK's liberal agenda, but would also reflect very poorly on Charles Kennedy, a man for whom I have a lot of respect. It is one thing for him to oppose the Coalition deal on a variety of policy and identity grounds. It is quite another to show total disloyalty and contempt for your successors, and to spit the proverbial dummy out the pram because your democratic party have come to a different conclusion from you. I hope for Kennedy's sake that this isn't true, and that he fights his battles from within the party, instead of making friends with those responsible for a 40 year debt legacy, erosion of civil liberties and the greatest vacuum of principles in British politics through the New Labour project.

My last article sees Nick Clegg's rebuke of a member of the public accusing the coalition of going on "an ideological crusade to attack the weakest in society". 

Leaving aside the low-grade rag the story's taken from, I find myself having a lot of sympathy with the content and manner of Clegg's response. The never ending rhetoric that's being thrown about, portraying the Tories (and via the Coalition, the Lib Dems) as people that will sell your gran on eBay and make you pay the Paypal fees is getting utterly tiresome. The public finances are in an absolutely appalling state, and people don't seem to be picking up that a) almost all of the cuts were of the scale and ilk Alistair Darling alluded to in "the deepest cuts since Margaret Thatcher", so would have been done by Labour anyway b) they're trying to minimise the threat to the absolute poorest by looking at universality of benefits and lowering, for example the Child Benefit threshold so families on two professional salaries, who clearly don't need it, no longer get the same as those who are genuinely impoverished.

Economic growth over the next few years, regardless of deficit reduction model, was never going to be as substantial as during the Blair-Brown years. The suggestion, therefore that we can sustain those sort of levels of spending, when Brown ran up annual deficits during boom-time, is borderline hilarious. The problem with the last 13 years is that people have grown to expect that the state will assist them to a level simply not viable. Responsibility and hard work have been replaced by senses of recklessness and entitlement. Of course some of the public spending was inherently good; few argue with that. The problem is that it was too much, too quickly and too unaccountably. PFI contracts handed out willy-nilly, keeping new schools and hospitals off the balance sheet, leaving the children of people yet to be born to pick up the last of the bill for facilities that will almost certainly be redundant in under 20 years. A tax and welfare combination that makes it less of an incentive for people to work more than 16 hours a week on the minimum wage than to sit at home and pretend to look for a job. That's the legacy we inherit, and although the next four years are going to be bloody difficult for all (and yes we'll have to be especially careful about the vulnerable) a sharp dose of reality being brought to public sector finances will leave us much stronger going forward.